📑 Table of Contents
Australian Government Warning: Security Clearances Are "Not a Marketing Tool"
Department of Home Affairs issues strict new policy prohibiting online disclosure of security clearance information to combat foreign interference targeting cleared personnel
Executive Summary
The Australian Government has issued a comprehensive policy directive addressing what it describes as a significant national security vulnerability: the public disclosure of security clearance information on professional networking sites and online platforms.
Policy Advisory 002-2025, released by the Department of Home Affairs under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF), takes an unequivocal stance on the matter.
The Threat Landscape
The advisory opens with a sobering assessment of Australia's security environment:
"Foreign interference and espionage are two of Australia's principal security concerns. Foreign powers are actively targeting Australian Government entities and their personnel for the information they access, with the appropriate capability. If they can, they will. And they are."
This directness reflects growing concerns within Australia's intelligence community about sophisticated foreign targeting of cleared personnel. According to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), foreign intelligence services have increasingly turned to social media and professional networking platforms to identify, assess, and approach potential targets.
Key Point: Information that identifies or alludes to personnel having access to security classified material, including that they hold a security clearance, is of particular interest to foreign powers.
Security clearances afford personnel privileged access to Australian Government security classified information and resources. Disclosure of security clearance and national security information makes personnel, their colleagues, and their organisations vulnerable to targeting by foreign powers and their proxies.
What the Policy Requires
The new directive mandates that all entities sponsoring security clearances must implement three key principles:
| Principle | Details |
|---|---|
| 1. Establish a Policy Prohibiting Publication of Security Clearance Information | The policy must allow for reasonably inferable information to be publicised, such as:
|
| 2. Training on Foreign Interference, Espionage, Cultivation and Exploitation | Foreign powers may pose as consultants, recruiters, government officials, academics or researchers to approach their targets and offer opportunities and financial incentives to report on Australian trade, politics, economics, foreign, defence and security policies. Foreign powers may attempt to manufacture circumstances and situations to create a sense of personal connection with personnel to cause them to make decisions. |
| 3. Encourage Proactive and Comprehensive Contact Reporting | Clearance holders must submit a report for activities or behaviours appearing to be one or more elements of SOUP: Suspicious, Ongoing, Unusual, or Persistent. |
The SOUP Reporting Framework
The advisory's introduction of the SOUP reporting framework provides clearance holders with a practical tool for assessing whether contact or approaches warrant reporting. This represents a shift from vague guidance to report "anything suspicious" to specific, memorable criteria.
🔍 SOUP Elements
- Suspicious: Contact that raises red flags or seems out of the ordinary
- Ongoing: Repeated contact attempts or sustained engagement
- Unusual: Behaviour that deviates from normal professional interactions
- Persistent: Contact that continues despite disengagement attempts
Security professionals note that the "Ongoing" and "Persistent" elements are particularly important, as foreign intelligence cultivation often occurs over extended periods, with seemingly innocuous initial contacts gradually becoming more targeted.
Reporting Channels
If personnel believe they have experienced contact with a foreign power, they should contact their Agency Security Adviser, Post Security Adviser or equivalent security personnel for advice, or:
📞 National Security Hotline (NSH)
- Phone: 1800 123 400
- SMS: 0498 562 549
- Email: hotline@nationalsecurity.gov.au
Reports can be made anonymously and are passed to appropriate law enforcement and security agencies.
🛡️ ASIO Reporting
- Portal: Notifiable Incidents, Threats, or Reportable Observations (NITRO) portal
- Phone: 13 ASIO (within Australia)
Direct reporting to Australia's security intelligence organisation.
The LinkedIn Problem
Whilst the advisory doesn't explicitly name platforms, the timing and content clearly address the widespread practice of Australian defence and government contractors listing their security clearances on LinkedIn profiles. Industry sources suggest thousands of Australian professionals currently display "NV1 Cleared," "NV2 Clearance," or "Top Secret Cleared" badges on their public profiles.
This practice, common in recruitment circles where clearances are seen as valuable employability credentials, has created what security experts describe as a "targeting catalogue" for foreign intelligence services.
Security Expert Perspective: "When you advertise your security clearance online, you're not just telling recruiters you're trustworthy - you're telling foreign intelligence services you have access to valuable information."
International Context
Australia's approach aligns with similar concerns in allied nations:
United States
The United States has long discouraged public disclosure of security clearances, with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) explicitly stating that clearance information should not be shared on social media or professional networking sites.
United Kingdom
The UK's National Protective Security Authority similarly advises against advertising security vetting status, though enforcement varies across departments.
What Sets Australia Apart
What sets the Australian directive apart is its formal integration into the PSPF - making it mandatory policy rather than advisory guidance - and its direct language about foreign intelligence threats.
Industry Implications
The policy has significant implications for Australia's defence and security sector, where clearances have become a de facto currency in recruitment. Recruiters frequently advertise roles requiring "active NV1" or "current NV2," and candidates have traditionally responded by prominently displaying their clearance status.
Industry representatives suggest this may require a fundamental shift in recruitment practices, with verification of clearances potentially moving to later stages of the hiring process rather than being part of initial screening.
Industry Perspective: "The tension between operational security and the legitimate needs of a defence industry relying on cleared personnel is real. But the policy is clear - national security trumps recruitment convenience."
What Happens Next
The policy advisory is accompanied by Policy Explanatory Note 004-2025, which provides additional implementation guidance. This document is available to Australian Government personnel through the Department of Home Affairs.
Entity Requirements
Entities sponsoring clearances are expected to:
- Review and update existing policies within reasonable timeframes
- Conduct training sessions for all cleared personnel
- Establish clear reporting procedures aligned with the SOUP framework
- Monitor compliance whilst respecting privacy considerations
Individual Action Required
For individuals currently displaying clearance information online:
The implication is clear - remove it. Whilst the policy doesn't outline specific penalties for non-compliance, clearance holders could potentially face administrative action or security concerns raised during periodic reviews.
A Broader Strategic Message
Beyond the immediate policy requirements, Advisory 002-2025 reflects Australia's increasingly hardline approach to foreign interference and espionage. The blunt language - "If they can, they will. And they are" - signals that Australian authorities view the threat as active and ongoing rather than theoretical.
This aligns with recent years' heightened focus on foreign interference, including:
- The establishment of the Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator position within the Department of Home Affairs
- Expanded powers for ASIO to investigate and disrupt foreign intelligence activities
- Increased public awareness campaigns about foreign interference risks
Conclusion
Policy Advisory 002-2025 represents a clear escalation in how Australia addresses the intersection of professional networking, recruitment practices, and national security. By formally prohibiting the online disclosure of clearance information whilst acknowledging legitimate professional needs, the government has attempted to strike a balance between security imperatives and practical realities.
For the estimated tens of thousands of Australians holding security clearances, the message is unambiguous: your clearance is valuable to Australia's adversaries, and advertising that you hold one makes you, your colleagues, and your organisation vulnerable to targeting.
As foreign intelligence tradecraft increasingly exploits digital platforms and professional networks, this policy advisory may be the first of many adjustments required to protect Australia's classified information in an era where the boundaries between professional networking and intelligence targeting have become dangerously blurred.
Important Resources
📚 Policy Framework
Website: protectivesecurity.gov.au
Access the complete Protective Security Policy Framework and related guidance
📧 Policy Enquiries
Email: PSPF@homeaffairs.gov.au
Australian Government personnel can request Policy Explanatory Note 004-2025
⚠️ Report Suspicious Contact
NSH: 1800 123 400
ASIO: 13 ASIO
Report SOUP: Suspicious, Ongoing, Unusual, or Persistent contact
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